Desk News :
The Indus Water Treaty is often presented as a “successful compromise” in the diplomatic history of South Asia. But to truly assess any agreement, one must look not only at its durability but also at its internal balance. It is true that the 1960 agreement has survived for more than six decades. But it is also true that from the beginning, there was a kind of inequality in the structure of this agreement, the impact of which still returns in various discussions today.
The Indus River System is basically made up of six major rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. The water of these rivers is not only essential for agriculture; it is also essential for drinking water, power generation and industry. After the partition, these rivers were divided between the two states. But the geographical reality was such that most of the rivers had their headwaters in Indian territory, while Pakistan’s vast agricultural area was dependent on the water of the lower reaches. As a result, the river issue quickly became a political and strategic issue.
Tensions over water between the two countries began after the partition of 1947. India, despite having the advantage of natural control as an upstream country, did not pursue complete dominance from the beginning. Rather, it tried to find a solution through negotiations. On the other hand, Pakistan raised the issue at the international level and adopted a strategy of continuous pressure. In this situation, the World Bank came forward to mediate.
The proposal made by the World Bank in 1954 later became the basis of the Indus Water Treaty. The proposal stated that the eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej would be used by India. On the other hand, the western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab would be allocated to Pakistan. This is where the question of major inequality first arose. Because the flow of the western rivers was comparatively much higher.
The final form of the treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi. The then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed it on behalf of India, President Ayub Khan on behalf of Pakistan, and a representative of the World Bank. It was presented as an example of a peaceful solution in the international community. But an analysis of the clauses of the agreement shows that India made concessions in several important areas.
Although India got full practical rights to the three rivers in the eastern region as per the agreement, the rights over the main flow of the three rivers in the western region practically went to Pakistan. According to the calculations, the annual flow of the western rivers was about 135 million acre-feet (MAF), and the flow of the eastern rivers was about 33 million acre-feet. That is, about 80 percent of the total water goes to Pakistan, and India gets only about 20 percent.
The matter did not end here. India also had to live with various limitations in the western rivers. India had to give up the right to divert about 3.6 MAF of water from the Chenab River. India also had to take a flexible position on the issue of important control systems like Madhopur or Ferozepur Headworks. Even in some areas, restrictions were imposed on new irrigation projects or water development activities.
The biggest limitation for India was the technical conditions for using the western rivers. India could build hydroelectric projects on its territory, but it had to comply with certain conditions regarding their design, water storage capacity, and even the construction of the dam. In other words, even though the river flowed through India, India did not have full practical freedom over it.
More surprising was the financial concession. As part of the agreement, India agreed to pay Pakistan about 62 million pounds so that Pakistan could build alternative canals and infrastructure. This was an exceptional event in international relations. Because here the upstream country not only gave up a large part of the water, but also paid for the construction of infrastructure in the downstream country.
Supporters say that this agreement has made it possible to avoid a full-scale water conflict between the two countries. The Indus Water Treaty did not completely collapse during the 1965, 1971, or the Kargil conflict. They point to this as proof of the stability and effectiveness of the agreement.
However, critics have a different view. According to them, the treaty has created a framework where India has not been able to exercise full control over the rivers in its territory, while Pakistan has gained more benefits in the long run. Especially when water is becoming the most important strategic resource in the future, such unilateral concessions are facing new questions.
Today, six decades later, to see the Indus Water Treaty as just a “symbol of peace” may be to deny the entire reality. An important lesson from history is that the power of a state is not only expressed in its military or economic capabilities but also in its restraint and sense of responsibility. India demonstrated that restraint in the Indus Water Treaty. Even as an upstream country, giving up the practical benefits of a large part of the river, and even providing financial assistance for the construction of infrastructure, was a rare diplomatic gesture by India. But the question is, has that generosity really created a balanced relationship between the two countries, or has it become a permanent structure of unilateral concessions by India over time?
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